Despite all Phil Jackson’s wisdom and his team’s experience, the Lakers never found an answer for J.J. Barea and his masterful direction of the Dallas pick and roll attack. 122 points, two cheap shots, and an awkward press conference later, we can look back and see how exactly the Mavs’ dismantled the two-time defending champs not just in Game 4 and throughout the series.
The lineup that gave L.A. the most trouble was a foursome of Dirk Nowitzki, Peja Stojakovic, Jason Terry, Barea, rounded out with either Tyson Chandler or Brandon Haywood manning the five spot. With this group on the floor, the Mavericks used a flat ball screen from Dirk to start off a majority of their possessions. In this alignment, Stojakovic and Terry stationed themselves flat in the corners while Haywood or Chandler would start near the short corner with their butt to the baseline (on the same side as Stojakovic). By flattening the defense with two deadly shooters in the corners and a 7-footer capable of attacking the rim for a lob, the defense is basically forced to play 2-on-2 versus Nowitzki and Barea at the top.
Spacing was crucial. As Barea came off the Nowitzki screen, Haywood or Chandler would inch toward the rim, while Stojakovic slid up, mirroring the 3pt line, on penetration. Terry would stay flat in the corner, daring his defender to help off and give JET the minimal space needed to squeeze off a 3.
Even before Game 1, it was no real secret that the Lakers had no one to defend quick point guards and that Pau Gasol struggles in pick and roll coverage. Those two things in combination with Dirk Nowitzki’s ability to be, well, really freakin’ good at basketball meant L.A. was destined for misery. These issues essentially forced them to scrap three of the more effective strategies in containing a flat pick and roll.
Dirk’s ability to not only catch and shoot from 25 feet, but attack off the bounce, exploit any mismatch in isolation, and pass the ball efficiently from the perimeter made it extremely risky to try and trap Barea coming off the screen. If they blitzed, Barea would most likely stretch the trap and lengthen X4’s recovery distance from Nowitzki. On a pass back to Dirk, X3 and X5 are essentially left to play 3 on 2 against Nowitzki, Stojakovic, and Chandler/Haywood. Against many power forwards, that’s not too awful a proposition. But if anything was evident after this series, it’s that Dirk is a vastly underrated playmaker. His precise decision making made this arrangement untenable for the Lakers.
Everyone knows switching against Dirk is suicide, but one of the other possibilities to defend this action would have been to force the ball handler to the crowded side of the floor. This would allow X3 to help the hedger (X4) contain the ball without creating too long of a closeout back to Stojakovic in the corner. But again, Dirk’s expansive offensive arsenal throws a major wrench into this plan. His defender would have to stick with the ball handler for 2-3 dribbles while Nowitzki spaces opposite.
X2 would be forced to play halfway between Nowitzki and Terry. He would most likely either stunt at Dirk before recovering to the corner or rotate to him completely. The options from that point are rather bleak as Dirk either attacks a mismatch or makes the extra pass to a wide open Terry in the corner.
The best way left for L.A. was to go under the screen and force Barea to beat the defense with his jump shot. This seems sound in theory, but applying it without a defender to match Barea’s quickness still resulted in failure.
In the following clip, Shannon Brown, given the task of chasing around Barea, chooses to defend him by going between the hedger and the screener in classic “hedge and recover” technique. While this is not trailing over the top, it’s not going all the way under, either, and even with a slight head start, the diminutive Puerto Rican turns on the jets to blow by Brown. The resultant help yields a long closeout that Stojakovic exploits with a textbook shot fake attack.
Barea’s penetration wasn’t the only thing that killed the Lakers on this play. By running a flat pick and roll, Nowitzki always makes any catch on his ‘pop’ near the top of the key. In the next clip, Jason Kidd is in for Barea, but the rest of the lineup remains intact. This time the high ballscreen results with Dirk getting the ball, isolated, in the middle of the floor against Andrew Bynum. The video is paused after his catch to see just how much room he has to operate in some prime real estate on the court.
Against Gasol or Bynum on this spot on the floor, L.A. has no choice but to leave a shooter and send help toward Dirk. With Dallas’s characteristic great ball movement, the ball rapidly finds Stojakovic in the corner for a three, beating a scrambling Laker defense.
In four shocking games, the Lakers three peat dreams were dashed. The “What Ifs” are sure to circulate in the coming days, but let there be no doubt about one thing: Dallas’s personnel and spread alignment were perfectly tailored to wreak havoc on the Laker defense. Few saw beforehand what everyone now knows: the Lakers demise was just matter of execution.
Twitter: @BKoremenos
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